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JUDIT SZATHMÁRI 
WISCONSIN: A MICROCOSM OF FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY 
This paper is constructed to provide an overview of the United States’ 
Indian policy through representative federal acts directed at solving the 
Indian problem. Both “solve” and “problem” express the standpoint of the 
United States Government and the attitude with which American Indians 
were viewed by mainstream society. The steadily growing visibility of the 
“Indian problem” pressured the federal government into action and, thus, 
the twentieth century has come to see numerous major orders targeting 
American Indian communities. The ones discussed here were selected out 
of the many due to the issues they address and the impact they, directly or 
indirectly, have had on present Indian affairs. I will demonstrate the 
original motives and unforeseen results of the 1887 General Allotment 
Act, the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act, and the policies of termination 
and relocation in the particular setting of the State of Wisconsin. 
Questions of self-determination and land possession will be analyzed 
as key factors in the quality of one’s minority status within the dominant 
society. The peculiar standing of the American Indian minority adds to 
the complex interpretations of the federal acts directed at solving the 
Indian problem. Upon the first contact with the Native inhabitants of the 
land Europeans saw two options for the American Indian: exterminate or 
assimilate. By the end of the nineteenth century extermination became a 
less realistic concept for the federal government due to costs of war and 
the increasing number of philanthropic attempts to save the man, if not 
the Indian. 
Independence as sought by the American Indian nations of the United 
States and the extent the United States allowed or hindered such attempts 
is an underlying issue of various government policies directed at the 
assimilation of Indian people. Self-determination is defined as the power 
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a given tribal entity possesses in controlling affairs within its territorial 
boundaries (O’Brien 45). Although the pendulum swung many times 
between the two extremes of assimilation and self-determination, the 
most harmful effects Indians saw in losing control over their own affairs 
lay in the opposing understanding and interests of self-determination. The 
federal government discarded the tribal element, and would acknowledge 
Indian self-determination exclusively at the individual level contrary to 
the Indian perception of the tribal nature of self-government. In terms of 
interests, the United States intended to deal with individuals, while 
Indians sought a special relationship with the federal government as 
independent nations.  
Historians Charles Olson and Raymond Wilson regard some of the acts 
discussed here as expressions of “the need to slow down” (161) the speed 
the United States intended to assimilate her Indian nations. The statement 
is valid and verified by the rather ambiguous intentions of government 
decisions. The discussion of such policies provides the bases for the 
establishment of a historical context which helps explain current Indian 
issues. Although federal acts were to remedy the national Indian problem, 
a demonstration of particular examples will highlight the discrepancies 
between intentions and results.  
Wisconsin: A “natural laboratory” 
In the preface to the 2002 edition of Wisconsin Indians Lurie claims 
that Wisconsin “has served as a kind of natural laboratory for most of the 
government’s policies and programs while at the same time Wisconsin 
Indian tribes and organizations have exemplified and sometimes led in 
new developments to improve the lives of Indian people” (IX). The first 
half of the quotation reveals the experience of being an experimental 
“species” in government politics, whereas the second expresses the 
outstanding abilities and achievements of the state’s Indian communities. 
The analysis of these two distinctive notions will highlight how Indian 
people profited from their relatively early experience of federal Indian 
policy. Lurie also claims that following the events of 1969—the first 
publication of her Wisconsin Indians—“Wisconsin continues to offer an 
unusual opportunity to understand the national Indian picture” (IX). This 
method also works reciprocally; the difficulties in mapping the Indian 
situation in multicultural America are easier to overcome with a special 
focus on one selected exemplary case. 
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Wisconsin hosts a large Indian population with tribes representing 
cultural and linguistic varieties. According to 2000 Census data the state’s 
total population of 5,363,675 includes 47,228 American Indians and 
Alaska Natives (Wisconsin Census). In view of the fact that the Indian 
population of the state is “the fourth largest east of the Mississippi River” 
(Lurie, Wisconsin 1) may explain its function as an experimental area for 
government policies. The Wisconsin Census data does not offer the 
category of American Indian or Native Alaskan alone or in combination, 
but the Census is the only resource one may employ for information of 
racial composition. The Census of total population by race divided into 
counties includes the category of two or more races with no reference to 
what combination it refers to, thus the number of the American Indian 
populace of the state is rather an estimate than exact data. 
To illustrate the variety of Indian cultures in the state and prepare for 
the analysis of Wisconsin’s particular standing in Indian policy the seven 
current tribes of Wisconsin will be discussed briefly. The Chip-
pewa/Ojibwa, Potawatomi, Menominee, Brotherton, Stockbridge-Munsee 
are Algonquian, the Oneida, former members of the Iroquois Con-
federacy, and the Siouan Winnebagos belong to three different linguistic 
stocks. The Brotherton have applied for federal recognition to the Bureau 
of Acknowledgement and Recognition but have not received federal tribal 
status as yet.  
The United States’ “divide and rule” policy affecting Indian popu-
lations is also a part of Wisconsin’s Indian history. The Menominee, “the 
oldest known continuous residents […] an undivided exclusively 
Wisconsin tribe” (Lurie, Wisconsin 10) and the Winnebagos, who now 
prefer to be called Ho-Chunk, were the first two nations populating the 
state. They arrived prior to white settlement, and lived in large com-
munities which explains why “[the Winnebagos] were so particularly hard 
hit” with the “impact of new diseases” (Lurie, Wisconsin 13) brought by 
newly arriving Indians and white settlers. Due to the settlers’ pushing 
Indians further west into the continent, Wisconsin also hosts “New York 
Indians” (Lurie, Wisconsin 10). The Stockbridge-Munsee, the Oneida and 
the Brotherton tribes are located in the north of the state. Their moving to 
Wisconsin in the 1820s and 1830s brought about clashes with the already 
present Menominee. Federal policy tried to compromise the conflicts 
“resulting in the most complicated set of Indian land transactions in 
Wisconsin” (Lurie, Wisconsin 10). There are six Chippewa/Ojibwa reser-
vations in the state, and they are spread over a wide area which accounts 
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for the “rise to virtually autonomous bands” (Lurie, Wisconsin 9). The 
tribe also has relatives in Canada, Minnesota and Michigan. The 
Potawatomi were also refugees in the state and have ties with their tribe 
located in Canada, Oklahoma and Kansas. “The Potawatomis had a 
cohesive sense of tribal identity, and their dispersion into separate entities 
resulted from their treatment by the government” (Lurie, Wisconsin 9).  
Rather than analyzing individual treaties signed by Wisconsin Indians 
and the United States, I will list selected examples of the government’s 
Indian policy and elaborate on how the state handles its own Indian 
problem. The twentieth century deserves special attention, as a number of 
precedents attracted national interest. Lurie states that “virtually every 
experiment in the history of the Indian policy has been tried out on one 
tribe or another in Wisconsin, but it seems that no matter what the 
government attempted, the effect was progressive impoverishment of the 
Indian people” (Lurie, Wisconsin 15). The precedents introduced here will 
describe how federal and state power affected any given Indian popu-
lation, and how Indian people tried to counteract the destructive forces of 
certain policies.  
Imbedded in the United States Indian policy was the concept that 
Indian people were disappearing fast on contact with white people. Policy 
makers constructed their theories around the concept of the “vanishing 
race” still prevailing in mainstream America. However, already in the 
nineteenth century treaty making period, the process of vanishing 
stopped. As Lurie says: “Had the treaty makers glanced eastward at the 
Indians longest in contact with whites, they would have seen that not all 
of them vanished and their population had ceased decreasing” (Lurie, 
Wisconsin 17). The Oneida provide a relevant example to this fact. By the 
time Wisconsin gained statehood in 1848, except for their reservation all 
Indian land was in the possession of the United States with the intention 
of Indians being relocated in Indian Territory west of the Mississippi 
River (Lurie, Wisconsin 22).  
Just as the reservation system provided a potential alliance of former 
enemies by uniting their forces against the United States, such dangers 
were also imbedded in settling various tribes in the proximity of each 
other. Again, Wisconsin proves how federal Indian policy was tested on 
the state’s Indian population. Three of the tribes were resettled in the state 
from the New York area; the Winnebago were divided within the state 
and western lands, while Wisconsin tribes who settled in the state earlier 
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were pushed to western territories. Only the Menominee avoided 
relocation (Lurie, Wisconsin 19–23).  
While most historians regard the 1889 Wounded Knee massacre to be 
the closing point of armed Indian resistance, the end of the treaty making 
period in 1871 and the 1887 obstruction of collective Indian land 
ownership had already paved the way for the last Indian war. Possession 
of tribal lands is a key issue in determining the status of the American 
Indian in mainstream American society and it is also a significant factor 
in the Indian communities’ self-perception. Thus the analysis of federal 
Indian policy must appropriately begin with a measure targeted at the 
destruction of tribal land bases: the General Allotment Act of 1887. 
The General Allotment Act (1887) 
The General Allotment Act was to destroy first all that was left of the 
Indian spirit by terminating tribal land bases. Although the year 1871 was 
meant to be the ending of the treaty making period, the United States 
government found new means to retain some of the land mass assigned to 
Indians in treaties. Formerly granted reservations included in the 
numerous treaties between the United States and any given tribe were 
broken up into parcels of land and ownership of 180-acre or smaller tracts 
was assigned to individuals and family units. The rest of the land was 
offered to anyone for purchase with the idea that the proceeds would be 
reinvested in the government’s integration process of the American 
Indian. The federal government designed a scheme by which the sums 
thus gained were to be used in the education of Indian people to acquire 
small-farmer skills and convert to an independent, agricultural way of 
life. 
The notion of independence in this context is defined by the United 
States and its political bodies, and not by the Indian communities affected 
by the act. Ideally, the thus trained Indian population was to become self-
sufficient and independent of all government agencies for annuities and 
other aids for their survival. But this notion also implied the loss of tribal 
cultures. By losing tribal land bases, Indian cultures would be void of a 
literal and figurative home ground. Many foresaw the problems buried 
under the integrationist slogan of the allotment policy. The scheme of 
utilizing surplus lands resulted in the fact that two-thirds of the formerly 
established reservations’ territory was sold out of Indian ownership by the 
mid-1930s (O’Brien 43). Thus lands, formerly secured by the treaties, fell 
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out of collective Indian control. Although the guidelines designed to 
govern the purchase of allotted and surplus reservation lands were to 
ensure the success of federal intentions to reshape American Indians as 
small-farmers, they did not achieve the federally desired aim. Experts 
predicted Indian assimilation into white culture would take approximately 
twenty-five years, and federal tax exemption during these years was 
supposed to assist Indian people in making a rather tolerable agricultural 
living. Another rule secured that allotments were not to be alienated for 
the same period of time. 
Small-scale farming did not prove to be a success. Firstly, the policy 
was introduced at a time when such agricultural methods were giving way 
to large-scale farming. The policy of allotment disregarded natural 
phenomena and some of the lands distributed among families were by no 
means suitable for farming. Also, many of the tribes lacked the tradition 
of family farming, and very little assistance was provided in terms of 
practical advice. Furthermore, the proximity of relatively well to do white 
neighbors who, at any time, could buy out Indian property created a rather 
insecure situation with regard to the rapidly shrinking tribal land base. 
Although tax exemption eased the burden of individual farmers, it did not 
compensate for the capital necessary for economic investment. Thus, 
white farmers in the proximity of reservations had the opportunity to rent 
Indian allotments for a nominal fee. More problems arose when allotted 
land became an issue of inheritance. The small acreage was divided into 
even smaller units, disabling heirs to make a living on farming. Since 
every single transaction was under the control of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, which was entitled to determine the fate of allotted parcels, much 
depended on the bureaucracy the Bureau of Indian Affairs represented. 
Corruption, which has posed a threat from the very first moments of the 
BIA’s existence, seriously hindered a beneficial and effective handling of 
matters from the Indian point of view.  
The first and rather practical step of diminishing the land base of any 
tribal entity directly led to the second, more political aim. Just as all other 
government decisions concerning the Indian peoples of the United States 
of America, this act also had two dimensions: on the one hand, the 
government could carry out and fulfill its role as guardian of its wards. In 
the long run, however, assimilation was the ultimate goal: by forcing 
Indian nations, or rather, individuals and family units to conform to 
mainstream ideals and way of life, the government was to solve the Indian 
problem by making the Indian disappear. The General Allotment Act may 
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also be interpreted as the revision of the formerly favored treaty-making 
policy. However successful and pragmatic the concept of reservations 
was, it failed to work in every case. As the Wounded Knee massacre 
suggests, the radical and quite war-like Plains tribes would not obey 
integration, much less assimilationist attempts.  
There were other reasons why reservations could not be considered an 
ultimate bliss to solve the Indian problem. Some regarded them as a 
possible cradle for allied Indian resistance against government actions. 
The General Allotment Act answered all these doubts by shifting the 
Indian problem to the individual or family level and, instead of 
negotiating with tribes, the federal government had an easier access to 
peoples’ control over their lives. With the loss of tribal land base, tribal 
governments also lost their say in tribal matters, since allotments were 
owned by family units. In the long run, tribal governments were expected 
to cease to function as a political body with power, however little it was, 
over Indian matters and this would have completed the assimilationist 
procedure. 
Vine Deloria argues that the most significant implication of the 
General Allotment Act is not included in the act itself, but is borne by the 
amendments which modified the original intentions of the government. It 
is explicit that the act, by assigning power to the president of the United 
States to decide single-handedly about allotting and purchasing land base, 
is a key factor in assimilationist attempts. More problematic is, however, 
the role of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which, under the amendments, 
was to gain more control and act on behalf of designated American 
Indians (Deloria 247). Moreover, the “educational” implications to train 
Indians as farmers lost their original impetus in view of how the Bureau 
under the Department of the Interior gained more administrative control 
over Indian matters.  
Similarly to all the actions to “solve” the Indian problem, the General 
Allotment Act also had philanthropic implications. Many, who wanted to 
save the American Indian, joined the assimilationist circle with the belief 
that the only way for native peoples of the country to survive is to 
assimilate to the dominant society. This implied the inevitable loss of 
Indian cultures, but, in their view, it was a rather small price in exchange 
for American citizenship. Collective land ownership, the Indian 
agricultural methods and the cultural differences were obstacles towards 
total integration. The fact that Indian people did not wish to be integrated, 
much less to leave their cultures behind for a granted acreage of land was 
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not an issue taken into consideration by friends of the Indian. The door 
was opened wide by the government and by various means it was 
dragging American Indians in a space where, superficially at least, they 
could “upgrade” their status to that of mainstream Americans.  
The 1887 General Allotment Act had severe consequences in the state 
of Wisconsin. Due to different tribal organizations, the seven Wisconsin 
tribes were variously affected by the parceling out of reservation territory. 
The Menominee already operated their lumber industry, and held the 
largest reservation land in the state which was never subjected to 
allotment. Proponents of allotment saw the Menominee success as a proof 
to the American Indian adapting to mainstream values. Although the tribe 
managed to avoid allotment, their economic prosperity did not save the 
reservation from another harmful government policy introduced seven 
decades later. 
The Oneida and the Stockbridge-Munsee reservations were eliminated 
and by 1910 “all the land was divided and fee patents were issued, taking 
the reservation out of tribal trust status” (Lurie, Wisconsin 37). As 
opposed to the “almost three-quarters loss sustained across the country,” 
in Wisconsin “about half of the total reservation acreage was lost” (Lurie, 
Wisconsin 37). Allotment bears its consequences even today, as when a 
tribally initiated business requires undivided land, parcels lost through the 
procedure of allotment may pose a problem. May it be lumbering, 
tourism, or any industrial or agricultural enterprise in the state, 
patchwork-like reservations make investment problematic. Self-deter-
mination also implies self-sustainment to a certain extent as federal 
assistance is unreliable to predict in long-term planning. And, though, 
allotment was repealed in 1934 with the passing of the Indian 
Reorganization Act, tribes are still struggling with its effects. 
The Indian Reorganization Act (1934) 
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 seemingly follows the spirit of 
slowing down the assimilationist policy of the United States. The IRA, 
designed primarily to revoke the harms caused by the General Allotment 
Act, and partly to compensate for its wrongs, enabled tribal communities 
to organize their own governments and practice the long-sought self-
determination. Self-determination in this context has two implications. 
Under the IRA, tribal governments are reorganized as “political com-
munities that could govern their citizens and deal with the federal 
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government” (Lacy 92). By extension of this rule, the Indian 
Reorganization Act is also a promotion of the formerly disregarded tribal 
identity (Holm 140). As the urban Indian population is not viewed as a 
separate entity at this point in time, the power thus assigned to tribal 
governments only applies to matters within reservation boundaries.  
The Indian Reorganization Act targeted four areas of American Indian 
reservation life. The first one was to allow Indians “residing on 
reservations to establish local self-governments and tribal corporations to 
improve tribal resources” (Olson and Wilson 116). Disregarding urban 
Indian populations this title of the act was to be the forerunner of self-
determination exclusively on reservations. Title II of the act aimed at 
assisting Indians by offering training “in forest management, public 
health, law enforcement and record keeping and provided scholarship 
money for gifted students” (Olson and Wilson 116) . Title III of the IRA 
was to end the General Allotment Act and to provide “consolidation of 
allotted and heirship lands into productive community use” (Olson and 
Wilson 116). Title IV established the Court of Indian Affairs to have 
“jurisdiction over reservation crimes and cases where at least one of the 
parties was Native American” (Olson and Wilson 116). 
The greatest achievement of the IRA is the result of its termination of 
the General Allotment Act. The Department of the Interior provided funds 
and returned some of the lands lost to allotment, but it was far less than 
the land which fell prey to the former government policy. Actual 
compensation for the loss of tribal land bases did not equal the fact that 
Allotment was outlawed. Although Olson and Wilson claim it an 
achievement, I do not believe that “the federal government had given at 
least lip service to the principle of self-determination” can be declared an 
overall success. Parts of the act targeting education, self-determination 
and jurisdiction in certain matters on Indian land are signs of the 
“revolutionary” changes in Indian policy after the General Allotment Act. 
Attempts had been made and many American Indians became aware of 
their power under the IRA, but the Act could not answer all the problems 
American Indians experienced. As the tragic effects of allotment became 
obvious by the 1920s, and John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
represented a more liberal view, a new policy was required to strengthen 
the Indian spirit. From the Indian perspective the first moves of the Act 
were unanimously viewed as positive. Repealing the allotment laws, 
reestablishing surplus reservation land and removing restrictions on 
exchanging allotment lands were vital deeds towards self-determination. 
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In addition, the referendum required of tribal communities to accept or 
reject the act was also a democratic notion never experienced by Indian 
communities before. Even the charting of tribal constitutions was 
assigned to Indian communities themselves. Such grand gestures of 
independence had never been displayed by the United States in its Indian 
policy.  
One of the most well-intentioned federal acts, the IRA is the first to 
allow existence within the Indian space and tribal entities to experience 
their own cultural existence. This existence, and the borders surrounding 
it are still drawn by the United States federal government, but it assists 
the ethno-racial bloc to construct itself from within, at least to a certain 
extent. This act may also be interpreted as a possible manifestation of 
future postethnicity, although its main function is to target the wrongs of 
former policies which the concept of postethnicity declares to go beyond. 
The benefits and novelties brought about by the IRA should point 
towards a brighter American Indian future in mainstream society. Yet, 
eventually, self-determination could not manifest at large. Even though 
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 was devoted to the principle of 
self-determination and tribal constitutions were to demonstrate such a 
principle, the Secretary of the Interior was delegated “significant veto 
powers over tribal affairs” (Olson and Wilson 161). This issue is further 
explored by Deloria, who relies on the wording of the Indian 
Reorganization Act when he questions its benevolent nature:  
The legislation governing Indians has always been tied to the phrase 
“the Secretary of Interior may authorize, in his discretion.” The Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934, generally thought of as the epitome 
liberalizing law toward the tribes, was replete with “the Secretary of 
Interior may authorize...” “the Secretary of Interior is hereby authorized 
to proclaim ...” “the Secretary of Interior is directed to make rules and 
regulations.” Even the tribal elections have had to be governed by “the 
Secretary of Interior under such rules and regulations as he may 
prescribe.” (qtd. in Steiner 264) 
The above excerpt highlights how Indian reorganization was allowed 
to materialize. Tribes were secured the right to counteract the previous
destructive federal Indian policy by reorganizing themselves, as long as 
such reorganization did not clash with federal interests. After any given 
tribe’s referendum to accept the IRA, tribes were to chart their own 
constitutions which, again although “had to be approved by the majority 
vote of the tribe” (Olson and Wilson 118) also required a consent from 
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the Secretary of the Interior (Olson and Wilson 118). Opponents to the 
IRA gained so much strength within a year after the act was passed, that 
“congressional appropriations to the Indian reorganization Act programs 
were cut beginning in 1935” (Olson and Wilson 120). An example from 
the State of Oklahoma illustrates the power the Secretary of the Interior 
held over Indian self-determination. Since reservations did not exist west 
of the Mississippi, Oklahoma Indians held a special relationship with the 
federal government different from that of reservation Indians. Under the 
Thomas-Rogers Bill American Indians in Oklahoma were placed under 
federal guardianship, but “in order to satisfy non-Native American 
assimilationists, mixed-bloods and assimilated Native Americans, the bill 
allowed Native Americans of less that half-blood Native American 
ancestry to be ‘relieved of all restrictions’ on their property” (Olson and 
Wilson 121). Indians who did not subscribe to federal guardianship had to 
apply to a special committee to determine whether they were competent 
enough to handle their own property. And it was “the Secretary of the 
Interior [who] would make the final decision in lifting such restrictions, 
based on recommendations from a special competency commission” 
(Olson and Wilson 121). 
The explicit aims of the Indian Reorganization Act may be regarded 
beneficial, but the political operations underlying it raise doubts of its 
outcomes. Self-determination seems to bear paradoxical connotations for 
many American Indian advocates of the IRA. While it implies a great deal 
of independence possessed by the tribes, it also relies heavily upon the 
concept of federal trust status. Following in the footsteps of the treaty-
making period, advocates of trust status wished to maintain the strongest 
ties possible with the federal government. Experiences with abridging 
voting rights merely a decade prior to the IRA may explain the preference 
for federal and the distrust for state and local agencies. Local and state 
governments have always been more likely to give priority to economic 
interests of non-Indian nature. Assigning the power to deal with Indian 
communities to local and state agencies was viewed as “a guarantee of 
discrimination and exploitation” (Olson and Wilson 162). To illustrate 
this point, Title III of the IRA evoked serious criticism from politicians 
who claimed that tribal governments with their own constitutions would 
“threaten the process of assimilation” (Olson and Wilson 117) and thus 
would pose and obstacle to the solving of the Indian problem. These 
Congressmen also feared that the land base freed by allotment would fall 
out of the reach of non-reservation interests. Their argument claimed that 
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under the IRA American Indians were “segregated […] from European 
society” (Olson and Wilson 120), but the underlying meaning implied the 
“[prevention of] ‘efficient’ development of reservation resources” (Olson 
and Wilson 120). With reservations broken up into checkers of land, 
efficient utilization of resources could only come from non-Indian 
investors, who would contribute to state tax revenues unlike the federally 
held trust lands. Added to this is the claim voiced by opponents that tribal 
land ownership “supported anti-Christian and communistic principles” 
(Olson and Wilson 120).
The setting up of tribal governments was regarded as a great 
opportunity for self-improvement. Yet, the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
strode to shape the newly forming tribal governing bodies in the image of 
the United States government. Tribal constitutions were to be charted to 
be duplicates of the United States Constitution regardless of any cultural 
and historical difference. Partly due to the limited success in assimilating 
the American Indian, the Bureau of Indian Affairs managed to take strong 
control over tribal matters. Ironically enough, despite its undoubtedly 
beneficial aspects, the IRA also marked the end of the decade of mild or 
slow assimilation. It only took a decade and a half for the pendulum to 
swing back towards the policy of aggressive assimilation.  
The discouragement of tribal practices is another example of how the 
cultural content of the American Indian bloc was held under supervision. 
When the tribes accepted to subscribe to the IRA they were offered 
assistance by the federal government in drawing up their constitutions. It 
is significant to mention here that the legal assistance came from 
members of the Interior Department who “prepared a model constitution 
to follow” (Olson and Wilson 119). Although some tribes found this 
helpful, many considered “its abundance of ‘legalese’ […] difficult to 
comprehend, and it was too general to take into account the particular 
needs and expectations of individual tribes” (Olson and Wilson 119). 
John Collier gave priority to Indian interest as much as he could in the 
bureaucratic decision making processes, yet, he was often criticized by 
Indian people themselves for underestimating American Indian cultural 
diversity and the frequent barriers of factionalism (Olson and Wilson 
122). The IRA required majority vote on many levels which “posed 
problems for a people who had a long tradition of reaching decisions by 
consensus or persuasion” (Olson and Wilson 122). The IRA also failed to 
acknowledge cultures where centralized tribal government had not been 
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part of the decision making process. The Wisconsin Winnebago and 
Menominee are two examples to illustrate the operation of the IRA. 
In 1926, on the request of the Board of Indian Commissioners, the 
Institute for Government research assigned the task of investigating 
American Indian grievances to Dr. Lewis Meriam, a social scientist. 
Financed by John D. Rockefeller, with a staff of nine education, health, 
sociology, economics and law experts, Meriam conducted a seven-month 
research including field trips throughout the United States. In 1928 the 
data collected was published under the title The Problem of Indian 
Administration (Olson and Wilson 100). The 1928 Meriam Report was 
designated to reveal the problems of the American Indian population in 
the United States. Just as in 1887, Wisconsin was cited as an exemplary 
case. The Menominee, who did not have to undergo allotment, were 
shown a model tribe with their successfully operating lumbering and 
forestry. The report did not claim the tribe to be well-to-do, but stated that 
it could “carefully manage” its business, “[provide] employment” and 
“[support] community facilities and services” (Lurie, Wisconsin 40). 
Interpreted as both a positive example to follow by Indian people and to 
prove the United States that tribes could manage on their own, the 
Menominee case should be ideal. For one, they were exempt from 
allotment the effect of which other tribes had to struggle with. More 
importantly, they seemed to be able to counteract the cultural de-
Indianization imbedded in the former federal Indian policy. Within their 
own Indian country, supporting themselves on terms mainstream America 
expected them to, the need to assimilate and lose Indianness was not on 
the agenda. As such, they counteracted the individualistic nature of 
American ideals, and still sustained tribal membership as primary 
affiliation. The Menominee proved that economic prosperity did not 
necessarily entail individualism as promoted by mainstream thinking. 
They provided an alternative to assimilationist policy by maintaining 
tribal property and economically functioning as mainstream society rules 
would direct.  
Neither the Winnebago nor the Menominee subscribed to the IRA as 
“they already had an elected tribal government that had evolved as their 
lumbering enterprise required tribal approval of contracts” (Lurie, 
Wisconsin 41). The Winnebago, with no reservation of their own, did not 
vote for or against the IRA, as they believed “it might jeopardize their 
long-standing hope of collecting money […] from old treaty negotiations” 
(Lurie, Wisconsin 41). Yet, other tribes profited from the IRA as two of 
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the Chippewa reservations, and the extension of the Stockbridge and 
Oneida lands became possible through the act.  
In conclusion, the Indian Reorganization Act had complex effects on 
the American Indian minority. Restoring tribal land bases was the first 
and foremost advantage Indian people could gain from the Act. Even 
though the amount of land could not compensate for the loss, it was a 
beneficial step on behalf of the federal government. Tribal constitutions 
and self-determination are more problematic to see in such a positive 
light, as the bureaucracy of the BIA and the singular power of the 
Secretary of the Interior hindered much of development the two titles 
offered. However, contrasted with the following acts the IRA was a 
permissive step toward self-determination. 
Termination (1954) and Relocation (1955) 
Shirley Witt sees the essence of termination policy as “[t]he unilateral 
withdrawal of federal services to Indians […] related policies and 
legislation, such as resolutions, bills, acts and public laws which lead to 
this same end” (96). The most assimilationist of all twentieth-century 
Indian policies, at its core, termination is the removal of tribal lands from 
tax exemption and placing them on state tax rolls. This entails that tribes 
are no longer subject to federal powers but to those of state and local 
governments. As it has been demonstrated, most Indian tribes regarded 
their special relationship with the federal government inevitable for their 
survival, thus termination meant a threat to tribal integrity. Similarly to 
the Indian Reorganization Act, the issue of self-determination is also an 
essential question here as “terminated tribes and non-federally recognized 
tribes, which make up almost one third of all indigenous peoples in the 
United States, have no federally recognized rights of self-determination” 
(O’Brien 44). Termination implies that tribes cease to exist as political 
units which would be represented by their own governments towards 
federal powers. By extension, it also means the loss of tribal integrity, and 
eventually, the loss of tribal cultures. Besides the economic and strongly 
related cultural issues, without the tribal land base, tribal governments 
which were set up under the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act are done 
away with and former tribal membership is replaced by a status similar to 
all other citizens of the United States. 
Within a decade, “Congress had terminated its relationship with 109 
bands and tribes” (O’Brien 44). Such figures explain why it is hard to 
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agree with Deloria’s standpoint that “too much is made […] of the 
importance of termination […] more important in terms of identifying 
the status of American Indians in American society was the propensity 
of Congress to continue the wartime subsidy into the cold war years” 
(“Evolution” 250).  
During the two decades between the Indian Reorganization Act and 
the policy of termination, many Indians moved to the cities in search of a 
better future. This, however, did not equal the rejection of one’s 
Indianness. The federal government disregarded the possibility that 
Indian space was carried internally and by the individual American 
Indian to any place they moved. From a mistaken federal perspective, 
Indians were flocking away from reservations in their attempt to 
integrate, at least economically, into mainstream American society, and, 
thus, the time seemed right to end the rather frustrating relationship with 
Indian tribes.  
Introduced in 1954, but already an existing plan in the late 1940s, 
termination was accompanied by the notion of relocation. From the 
federal perspective, the two policies rely on and generate each other. 
Mass migration off the reservations into the cities was to bring about the 
disintegration of existing Indian communities. By promoting relocation in 
urban areas, termination of tribal entities seemed a logical step. The 
reverse process is also verified. Withdrawing federal services from 
reservations would result in American Indians seeking the same services 
under seemingly better circumstances, more accessible in cities than in 
rural areas. While more and more Indian people are encouraged to leave 
the reservations behind and try an “independent” life in one of America’s 
large cities, there is the distinct possibility that the a slowly disintegrating 
political body of tribal governments will soon cease to function.  
Just as in the case of the General Allotment Act, the underlying 
intention was to solve the Indian problem by discarding the Indian 
features and viewing the problem, such as poverty, lack of education, 
housing matters by the same standards as all other, similarly 
disadvantageous people would share. However, in this view, the major 
principle is not the issue of equality, but the disregarding of tribal 
features, and special cultural traits. Termination illustrates the cultural 
conflict which has existed ever since the first contact between Europeans 
and American Indians as it fails to acknowledge Indian people’s rejection 
of individualism. Although it is considered outdated in the twentieth 
century, Indian communities believed in cultural and not individual 
survival. The problems of housing, lack of education and poverty are 
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notions that Indian people attempted at solving communally. Their belief 
in being “sovereign, dependent” nations protected by the United States 
Government still persists. Unlike other disadvantageous minorities, the 
partially restored tribal land bases under the IRA, merely two decades 
prior to termination, provided a possibility to negotiate with the federal 
government. This is not to say that reservations were the sole locale of the 
Indian problem, and as the federal government came to see it, it had to be 
relocated in order to be solved more easily.
Moving to urban areas accelerated after Word War II and was 
strongly encouraged by the Bureau of Indian Affairs Voluntary 
Relocation Policy of 1955 whereby the BIA subsidized transportation to 
and adjustment in an urban environment. The Bureau of Indian Affairs 
was to assist both total integration in mainstream American society and 
the preservation of a separate Indian character in cities. Neither of these 
declared goals accomplished in their entirety. Relocation was a means to 
promote integration, but this attempt failed. The promise that city life 
would bring about improved social and economic conditions compared 
to reservations proved to lack any foundation. Unemployment, poverty, 
housing problems, and the lack of education were as pressing problems 
in the cities as they were on the reservation. In addition, off-reservation 
Indians experienced a total neglect of their existence. Louis Bruce, 
Nixon’s Commissioner of Indian Affairs, experienced very harsh 
criticism from urban Indian groups as soon as he took office. They 
attacked the Bureau’s passivity, in response to which the Commissioner 
said, “the Bureau of Indian Affairs is concerned primarily with Indians 
living on tribal lands. It is neither set up nor financed to assume 
responsibility for off reservation Indians” (“Militant” n.pag). This 
response justifies the interconnected nature of termination and 
relocation. No matter what the original intentions were, neither 
relocation, nor termination could solve the “Indian problem.” On the 
contrary, not only did it remain a significant issue, but it soon acquired 
new characteristics. 
Relocation policy was to assist American Indians’ blending in not only 
urban, but by the same token, mainstream American society. Ideally, 
those who undertook relocation to urban areas were expected soon to 
adjust to city life and become “lost” in the cities as Indians. At its best, 
this disappearance was literal and figurative at the same time. On the 
surface the program did not conflict with Indian aims, as the largest 
attraction of leaving home communities was economic improvement. 
However, frequent returns to the reservations, at least once a year 
according to 1960s count (Mudgett and Wilson 1) did not assist cutting 
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the ties with one’s American Indian roots. A seasonal fluctuation can also 
be detected in city Indian populations. In addition, a “reverse relocation” 
process affected not only those who were unable to adjust and adapt to 
urban living but it “varies from those who could not be successful in an 
urban, mostly white environment to professionals who adjusted easily to 
non-Indian society” (Mullen). Reservations were still considered the sole 
homeland American Indians possessed even if living in cities.  
In Wisconsin, urban Indian populations were significantly altered due 
to relocation. “The state’s largest intertribal urban population is in 
Milwaukee (variously estimated today at around 10,000), where Indian 
people began settling in the 1920s and, in 1937, founded the state’s first 
(and among the nation’s oldest) urban Indian organizations, the 
Consolidated Tribes of Milwaukee” (Lurie, Wisconsin 1). While other 
large cities in the United States, such as Denver, Chicago, New York and 
Los Angeles hosted designated BIA offices to assist relocation, 
Milwaukee was never declared an official relocation city under the 
Voluntary Relocation Program of the 1950s. Nevertheless, the growing 
number of relocatees in the city led to the Bureau’s setting up of 
“information clearinghouses” (Lurie, Wisconsin 48) to assist its Indian 
population of considerable size. The city drew most of its Indian migrants 
from Wisconsin. The relative proximity of home communities, however, 
was not sufficient enough to assist adaptation to city life. Decades after 
the first urban self-help organization came to being new forums were 
necessary to help relocatees cope with the non-reservation environment. 
In Milwaukee, an urban Indian culture center, numerous self-help 
oragnizations and a tribally run school helped reconcile the differences 
between non-Indian urban communities, reservation communities and 
urban Indian communities. Many of the organizations which sprang up 
during the relocation period disappeared after a few years of operation, 
but some are still active today with slightly altered programs on their 
agenda.  
In Wisconsin the policy of termination had two significant conse-
quences. The first was the state’s acceptance of Public Law 280, a federal 
statute, which enabled states to assume criminal, as well as civil 
jurisdiction in matters involving Indians as litigants on reservation land. 
Prior to Public Law 280, these cases were the responsibility of either 
tribal or federal courts. “Essentially, Public Law 280 was an attempt by 
the federal government to reduce its role in Indian affairs” (Public). 
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Enumerated in Public Law 280 were six states which were “obliged to 
assume jurisdiction from the outset of the law,” (Public) including 
Wisconsin. Many opposed the enactment of Public Law 280 in the state 
for numerous reasons. As in many other cases affecting Indian matters, it 
was passed without the consent of Indian people. Although in 1968 it was 
amended “requiring the consent of the tribe, consent was not required for 
states that had assumed jurisdiction up to 1968” (Public). Thus, 
Wisconsin acted without tribal consent. In addition to this argument based 
on moral grounds, a more pragmatic explanation was explicit to the 
opponents. With termination and relocation on the agenda, Public Law 
280 was just another move of the federal government to shift economic 
responsibilities of the pressing Indian problem onto the states.  
The second, and more severe, effect of termination is displayed by the 
fate of the Menominee tribe. The oldest, exclusively Wisconsin, tribe had 
been mentioned with regard to the policies affecting the tribes of the state. 
Their success in avoiding allotment backfired with the policy of 
termination and their exemplary status in the Meriam report brought 
tragic consequences. As the report proved the Menominee success in their 
enterprises, they became primary targets on the termination agenda. 
Although the tribe had about “$10 million in cash assets” (Lurie, 
Wisconsin 47), awards from a suit with the federal government for 
mismanagement of their business, the Menominee were cheated into 
termination. “The tribe had voted to use more than half of their award in 
per capita payments […] the rest they earmarked for improvements to 
their hospital and other tribal purposes” (Lurie, Wisconsin 47). Still 
following the practice of the ward-guardian relationship between Indians 
and the federal government, Congress had the final say in paying the 
award. The Menominee were called together on two occasions to vote 
about the issue of termination. The first time they were threatened that if 
they rejected termination, their awards, even though they were its rightful 
possessors, would not be allocated for per capita payments. The voting 
procedure confused tribal members, since the two questions of accepting 
termination and renouncing the money already awarded, were posed 
singularly. A single “yes” or ““no” was accepted to answer the two 
questions. As people were concerned with their legal claims, most of 
them voted “yes” which in the government’s reading meant an acceptance 
of termination. By the time the tribe called together a second poll and 
explicitly voted against termination, Congress had accepted the first 
results and neglected the unanimous tribal rejection of termination (Lurie, 
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Wisconsin 46–50). Just as in the case of the interpretation of treaties, 
purposefully ambiguous communication was a major weapon in the hands 
of proponents of Menominee termination to deceive Indian people. “The 
principle of termination” (Lurie, Wisconsin 47) and the combination of 
the two issues entrapped the Menominee in a situation which took two 
decades to change. The Menominee Termination Act was passed in 1954, 
and went into effect in 1961.  
The consequences of termination were devastating for the Menominee. 
Most of their “working capital had been wiped out because the 
government had forced them to pay part of the cost of developing a 
termination plan they had not wanted in the first place” (Lurie, Wisconsin 
53). As a result of this, the tribe lost its hospital and businesses which 
they were supporting on the award money. The Menominee Reservation 
was renamed Menominee County, but this name change was the least 
harmful of the consequences of termination. For services they had 
provided for themselves before the act was passed, they had to rely on 
Shawano County. The tribe was turned into Menominee Enterprises, Inc. 
(MEI) which functioned as a business management body with former 
tribal members being stock holders in the company. Seemingly a 
democratic organization, MEI operated with a “voting trust that actually 
held all the shares and voted those of minors and ‘incompetents’ as a 
bloc” (Lurie, Wisconsin 53). This meant that the Menominee people had 
less say in their own affairs than ever before, and as MEI was headed by 
white businessmen, the organization could not function as a tribal 
enterprise. With losing money to termination, and the effects of the loss 
of federal trust status, the Menominee soon had to apply for emergency 
investments from the federal government to cope with increasing 
problems. Tribal self-sufficiency was also terminated with its loss of 
federal trust status. Since MEI was not bound to represent Menominee 
interests it soon became apparent that its business transactions did more 
harm than advance people’s lives, thus in 1970 concerned Menominees 
formed “Determination of Rights and Unity for Menominee Shareholders 
(DRUMS)” (Lurie, Wisconsin 54). The acronym was an appropriate 
choice of name, as it symbolically expresses, on the one hand, the 
Menominee’s voicing their concerns over mismanagement of business, 
and, on the other, recalls an American Indian symbol of unity with sacred 
implications. With the help of DRUMS, a march to the state capitol, 
explicitly a Civil Rights method, the assistance of Governor Patrick 
Lucey, and lobbying Congress, the tribe succeeded in repealing 
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termination in 1973. The Menominee Restoration Committee, headed by 
Ada Deer, was set up to recover as much of the loss as possible, and its 
primary goal was to achieve “federal protection without federal 
domination” (Lurie, Wisconsin 55).  
Between the enactment of the Menominee termination act and 
restoration in 1973, the situation of the tribe altered both economically 
and socially to the extent that a single act could not restore the original 
state of tribal trust. One concomitant of the termination period was 
increased Indian Activism. The Menominee offer an example with the 
Menominee Warrior Society, who, dissatisfied with the slow changes 
after restoration and claiming that the newly established Restoration 
Committee “were insensitive to the grass roots people” (Lurie, Wisconsin 
56) occupied the vacant Alexian novitiate, property of the Roman 
Catholic Church. This former place of peace turned into a “war zone” and 
a “training ground for militants and the military” (Wells n.pag.). The 
Warriors believed that instead of the slow bureaucratic procedures of the 
Restoration Committee, direct action was needed for the tribe to be 
restored. The takeover also had greater implications, as the reasons cited
by the warriors varied from “racism by whites against Indians” to 
“secure[ing] a hospital for the tribe” and “to protest the terms of the 1934 
Indian Restoration Act and the way it was executed in Menominee 
County” (Wells n.pag.). Remembering the violence of Alcatraz, and the 
Wounded Knee trading post occupations, the Wisconsin National Guard 
was called in to ward off more serious events. The handful of warriors 
faced 1000 National Guardsmen in their 34-day occupation of the 
novitiate. The Restoration Committee renounced any connection with the 
Warrior Society, and the occupation resulted in tribal factionalism. 
Commenting on the takeover the acting tribal government described the 
Warrior Society as a “dissident minority who were disenchanted after 
losing an election” (Wells 7). “Further internal disturbances […] 
including seven violent deaths” resulted in the fact that “it took the 
Menominee five years to reach an agreement on a constitution and the 
election of permanent officers” (Lurie, Wisconsin 56).  
These incidents are proofs to how termination did not only affect the 
tribe economically, but also had social and political consequences. Tribal 
factionalism and conflicts between MEI, DRUMS and The Menominee 
Warriors Society eventually could have led to total dispersion. Yet, 
cultural bonds are stronger and being a Menominee took priority over 
these struggles. This is not to say that all the problems were soothed with 
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the help of the tribal culture, but the Menominee tribal spirit proved 
stronger than the harmful effects of government policy. Their case also 
demonstrated to the government that termination is not only a dead-end 
solution to the Indian problem, but, in fact, increases it and requires more 
federal assistance than before.  
With their failure, both termination and relocation proved that the 
decades after World War II already bore the ideals of a multicultural 
society. The unsuccessful attempt to make the Indian disappear either in 
urban areas or with the destruction of reservations may also be identified 
as the time when one of the ethno-racial blocs voluntarily strengthened 
and maintained its borders separating the culture it holds, thus increasing 
the values American Indian cultures possess. The underlying assimilation-
ist intentions of allotment, relocation and termination are contrasted with 
the Indian Reorganization Act allowing self-determination. Within the 
span of seven decades the policy of total assimilation as promoted by the 
General Allotment Act was revoked as a failure and mildly compensated 
by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, but termination and relocation 
followed the guidelines and intentions of the former. Today in Wisconsin, 
the forces shaping federal Indian policy accumulate in various treaty 
rights controversies. However, as the events in Wisconsin demonstrate, 
water, hunting and fishing rights issues do not only entail antagonism and 
anti-Indian sentiments.  
Treaty Rights Controversies 
Quoting Martin Luther King’s “I had a dream,” Joe Handrick says: “If 
King were alive today to make such a statement in northern Wisconsin in 
1987, he would be branded a racist by those who support American 
Indian spearfishing” (n.pag.). The author of “WE ARE NOT RACIST” is 
referring to the conflicts arising from treaty interpretations, and the 
consequences it had in Wisconsin. Treaty Rights Controversies affected 
the Chippewa people the most. Following the Civil Rights tactics already 
mentioned with regard to the Menominee, the Lac Courte Oreilles 
Chippewa took immediate action and occupied a dam to protect their 
rights promised in 1921. The Lac Courte Oreilles protested the 
destruction of Indian graves and homes, and the flooding of more 
reservation territory than the contract assigned to the Northern States 
Power Company. The flooding affected wild rice beds which the Lac 
Courte Oreilles were dependent on (Lurie, Wisconsin 65). The Chippewa 
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right to hunt and fish on ceded land was upheld pursuant to the treaty of 
1837. Although the Lac Courte Oreilles originally based their argument 
on business contracts, the case soon entailed the issue of treaty rights. “A 
precedent-setting case in 1974 in the state of Washington had special 
importance for the Wisconsin Chippewas” (Lurie, Wisconsin 66). The 
case stated that Indian people were entitled to gather, hunt and fish in the 
territories they ceded, since they signed away the land itself and not the 
rights connected to it. Fishing and tourism was a growing attraction in 
Wisconsin providing increasing revenues, and the state soon became 
concerned with “illegal” Indian fishing and hunting. The matter became 
more complicated with the enactment of Public Law 280, mentioned 
above. On Indian protest in 1966, “the state attorney general ruled that the 
state could enforce its game laws on Indians only outside the boundaries 
of reservations” (Lurie, Wisconsin 66).  
1974 saw the evolving conflicts of the Lac Courte Oreilles Band when 
they argued that the arrest of two band members for spearfishing off the 
reservation abrogated their treaty rights. The case began in 1974 but it 
reached final decision only in 1990. The trial went from court to court and 
the Lac Courte Oreilles were joined by the other five Chippewa bands “as 
parties to the same treaties” (Lurie, Wisconsin 68). During the fifteen 
years the case passed through three phases, the first, “declaratory” one 
designated to “determine the nature and scope of Chippewa treaty rights” 
(Lurie, Wisconsin 68). Anti-treaty concerns targeted the time of signing 
the treaties and claimed that the Chippewa were only entitled to use the 
“aboriginal” methods and the amount of spearfishing should not succeed 
subsistence level. The second, “regulatory” phase determined “the 
permissible scope of regulation by the state of Wisconsin in view of the 
fact that the landscape, ownership, and distribution of species had 
changed in the ceded area” (Lurie, Wisconsin 69). The last, “damages” 
step was to determine “the amount of damages, if any, the Chippewas 
were entitled to for interference in their treaty rights” (Lurie, Wisconsin 
69). Although the tribe had the opportunity to turn to the Supreme Court 
to overrule a previous decision denying their right for compensation, they 
declined “as a gesture of peace and friendship towards the people of 
Wisconsin, in a spirit they hope may some day be reciprocated on the part 
of the general citizenry and officials of this state” (Lurie, Wisconsin 69).  
The hope Indian people set forth in this declaration was, however, an 
unfounded one. The quotation recalling Martin Luther King’s dream 
appeared in an issue published by one of the Wisconsin anti-treaty and 
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anti-Indian groups. Associations, such as PARR (Protect Americans’ 
Rights and Resources), STA (Stop Treaty Abuse, Inc.) and WARR 
(Wisconsin Alliance for Rights and Resources) (Lurie, Wisconsin 70) 
posed serious threats to any Indian action. The last acronym suggests 
what these groups believed to be “peace and friendship.” The Milwaukee 
Public Museum’s Native American Resource File includes publications of 
the above mentioned groups which reveal the severity of the conflict. In 
“WE ARE NOT RACIST” Handrick claims that “BECAUSE of Indian 
spearing, more and more people are acquiring racist attitudes” (n. pag.). 
He also states that those who insist on spearfishing should turn their 
attention to other matters as “American Indian children do not need fish, 
they need jobs” (n. pag.). The PARR issue containing this article also 
features a publication which brings together Wisconsin’s two stereotypi-
cal “products”: Indian spearfishing and beer. The irony of the case is 
unquestionable as the introduction of the Anti-Treaty Beer was timed for 
a peaceful rally in support of the Indian cause. A Chippewa tribal leader 
also remarked that those who “caused the most trouble were the drunks” 
(Waukau n.pag.)  
The Anti-Treaty Beer also demonstrates how non-Indian residents of 
the state cooperated with the tribes. The drink was boycotted (“Treaty”), 
but more significant than this gesture is the assistance of civil rights 
groups and the foundation of HONOR (Honor Our Neighbors Origins and 
Rights) which, by the 1980s grew from a Wisconsin organization to be a 
national-scale association and still assists in Indian affairs (Lurie, 
Wisconsin 71).  
One of the earliest unified attempts of American Indian organizations 
to act as one entity was a state-level venture, the Native American Project 
of 1975. Launched from Milwaukee, the need for the unification of Indian 
interests materialized on the state level. Local organizations and their 
most urgent concerns tend to accord with state organizations and their 
objectives. The network of familial ties in American Indian communities 
also contributes to interaction of organizations, whether smaller or larger 
scale. Upon a 1973 request on behalf of the Indian Community in the 
State of Wisconsin, Governor Patrick J. Lucey set up the Native 
American Project. It was to evaluate services in the most problematic 
fields of health, education, housing, employment and law enforcement 
offered by the state to various Indian communities. The project board 
included representatives of American Indian communities in Wisconsin 
and the Governor’s Equal Rights Council. One direct aim was to establish 
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clear lines along which local, state and federal responsibilities were 
distributed in the above mentioned areas (Indian Community Meeting). 
Another objective, if less overt, is marked by the timing of the project. By 
the early 1970s, dissatisfaction with services to American Indians caused 
militant turmoil in various states. The proximity of Wounded Knee in 
South Dakota and the relatively large Indian population scattered over the 
State of Wisconsin may explain the Governor’s assistance and willingness 
to contribute to launching a unified American Indian project.  
Not only did Wisconsin set examples for Indian issues all over the 
country, the state also actively contributed to federal Indian affairs. As 
Lurie claims the state “has reflected, exemplified and helped to shape 
national Indian policy […] [and] sent three people to head the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs: Philleo Nash, Robert Bennet and […] Ada Deer” (Lurie, 
Wisconsin 89). In such a diverse Indian environment, with such historical 
experience of federal Indian policy, Wisconsin Indian people are the 
perfect example of how federal and local forces affect tribes, and how 
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